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Abstract
Over the past several decades, advances in technology have transformed
communications and the ability to acquire, disseminate, and utilize
information in a range of environments. Modern societies and their
respective militaries have taken advantage of a robust information space
through network-centric systems. Because military and commercial
operations have increasingly converged, communication and information
infrastructures are now high-priority military objectives in times of war.
This article examines the theoretical underpinning of current cyber
warfare research, what we have learned so far about its application, and
some of the emerging themes to be considered; it also postulates the
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development of a (national) cyber warfare doctrine (CWD). An endeavor
of this scale requires lots of considerations and preparation for its
development if it is to be cooperatively embraced. This article considers
why information technology systems and their supporting infrastructures
should be considered legitimate military targets in conflicts, and offers
several events that support this supposition. In addition, it identifies the
various forms of doctrine that will become the basis for developing a
CWD, discusses a CWD's possible components, and proposes a national
collaborative and discussion framework for obtaining a nation's
stakeholder buy-in for such an endeavor.
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Introduction
Over the past several decades, advances in technology have transformed 
communications and the ability to acquire, disseminate, and utilize 
Abstract
Over the past several decades, advances in technology have transformed 
communications and the ability to acquire, disseminate, and utilize infor-
mation in a range of environments. Modern societies and their respective 
militaries have taken advantage of a robust information space through 
network-centric systems. Because military and commercial operations 
have increasingly converged, communication and information infrastruc-
tures are now high-priority military objectives in times of war. This article 
examines the theoretical underpinning of current cyber warfare research, 
what we have learned so far about its application, and some of the emerg-
ing themes to be considered; it also postulates the development of a 
(national) cyber warfare doctrine (CWD). An endeavor of this scale 
requires lots of considerations and preparation for its development if it is 
to be cooperatively embraced. This article considers why information 
technology systems and their supporting infrastructures should be con-
sidered legitimate military targets in conflicts, and offers several events 
that support this supposition. In addition, it identifies the various forms 
of doctrine that will become the basis for developing a CWD, discusses a 
CWD's possible components, and proposes a national collaborative and 
discussion framework for obtaining a nation's stakeholder buy-in for such 
an endeavor.
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information in a range of environments. As a result, modern armies have 
advanced their command and control capabilities by using a robust 
information space through network-centric warfare. The ever-increasing 
convergence of military and commercial operations warrants considering 
the possibility that communication and information infrastructures are 
viable components—both as targets and weapons—in times of war. 
Developments in recent years indicate that Internet and Communication 
Technology (ICT) in particular are becoming a viable theater of military 
conflict. The possibility of widespread conflicts fought in cyberspace 
continues to arise as digital warfare capabilities are developed. The 
deployment window for a cyber attack has a dramatically different form 
from traditional conflicts, and thus requires a different planning defense 
structure. Such an attack could be quickly prepared by a relatively small 
group; launched without warning from anywhere on the globe against any 
possible ICT target; and escalate in a matter of minutes to shut down 
national infrastructures.1
In this context, each modern state should be prepared to be the target of a 
cyber warfare attack and stand ready to launch a counteroffensive. Prepa-
rations for such conflicts have already started in many other countries, 
including Israel, North Korea, Iran, and Russia.2 When we examine these 
activities from a more holistic perspective, the preparation for both offen-
sive and defensive cyber capabilities has both technical and public-policy 
components. In other words, nations need to find answers and solutions 
to questions such as:
•   What activities must be undertaken in the case of a cyber attack against 
a nuclear power plant?
•   What is the measured and appropriate response to such an attack?
•   What level of attack threshold constitutes an act of war?
With cyber attacks, there is no time to deliberate a comprehensive 
response. We believe modern nations lack a grand strategy for handling 
cyber attacks, one that gathers and coordinates their national resources 
for shared security and prosperity.3 Hence, we suggest that each country 
develop a Cyber Warfare Doctrine (CWD) that includes all stakeholders, 
brings about a decisive conclusion when such attacks occur, and serves to 
deter future conflicts through a unified national security policy.
Developing a comprehensive CWD is a complex task requiring much 
preparation. Nevertheless, both civilian and military establishments have 
made considerable progress toward securing their national infrastruc-
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tures and preparing for war in the cyber realm. Unfortunately, these 
efforts are being developed and implemented in a piecemeal manner. The 
planning components of both civilian and military interests are separate 
and disjointed, regardless of provisions that both sides believe will create 
synergistic outcomes.4 What's missing is a true systems approach to han-
dling conflicts originating in cyberspace that cross many jurisdictional 
boundaries and interests. What's needed is a general national policy on 
how to handle IT-based attacks that disturb a country's normal function-
ing. Such a policy should embody a set of self-defense principles inclusive 
of civilian infrastructure, military objectives, and national security policy. 
This article argues for establishing a CWD that would be used to deter-
mine a nation's appropriate response when attacked via cyberspace. Such 
a doctrine would be used as a guide for defense forces in a time of conflict; 
as a unified governing philosophy for military operations, deployment to 
protect civilian infrastructure, and the governance of international cyber 
relations; and as a deterrent to future adversaries.
The objective of this article is to summarize the considerations that would 
allow senior leadership to develop a comprehensive, strategic CWD. We 
will discuss the justification for considering information technologies in 
military conflicts, and the events supporting our supposition; the various 
doctrines that will form the basis for developing a CWD; and the possible 
components of a CWD. We will also propose a national collaborative 
framework for obtaining stakeholder buy-in for a CWD, and offer some 
final conclusions.
Setting the Stage: Milestones in Cyber War
In his celebrated book, On War, Carl von Clausewitz defines war as 
merely a duel on an extensive scale.5 While such conflicts commonly 
occur between two parties, sometimes they enlarge to encompass multi-
ple states, regional alliances, and federations of nations, in which the con-
flict is essentially between two sides; for example, the Axis Powers and the 
Allies in World War II. These types of wars, generally called symmetric, 
are often characterized by large conflicts between sides of relatively equal 
strength, resources, and technological capabilities. For many reasons—
such as international treaties, global governance initiatives, and advances 
in military technology—these duels are becoming less frequent. Two of 
the biggest conflicts in recent years, in Iraq and Afghanistan, started as 
duels but quickly migrated toward a different type of conflict: asymmetric 
war.
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In its simplest form, "have-nots" undertake such warfare against "haves," 
seeking victory by employing their specific advantages against the vulner-
abilities of a much stronger opponent.6 To overcome the disparity in 
strength, the weaker antagonist looks for asymmetric options, targeting 
the "will" of the stronger opponent by strategically pursuing dispropor-
tionate psychological effects.7 In the authors' view, being able to turn 
opponents' greatest strengths into their greatest weaknesses is the high-
est, most refined form of asymmetric warfare.
For decades, adversaries have compromised the use of information 
technology by stealing financial, proprietary, and/or secret information, 
and continue to do so today.8, 9 So dependent on technology have modern 
nations become that they are fundamentally weakened when such 
systems and processes are disrupted for any meaningful time. This 
vulnerability, of course, continues to have national security implications. 
As a result, numerous national and international efforts have been made 
to develop policies for combating the use of cyberspace for criminal 
activities.10, 11, 12, 13, 14
In recent years, a series of milestones have provided clear indicators for 
the viability of asymmetric conflicts originating in cyberspace. The most 
significant of these have involved the European nation state of Estonia, 
which has implemented a highly integrated e-government infrastructure. 
The country was forced to digitally isolate itself when unknown, politically 
motivated attackers initiated a series of distributed denial of service 
(DDoS) assault incorporating one-million-strong botnet. The attacks on 
Estonia's Internet systems began in April 2007 and lasted three weeks, 
but it is their sustained impact that's of primary importance to this 
discussion, rather than the technological methods employed.15 We believe 
the attacks, which the Estonian government has labeled "cyber 
terrorism," have provided the impetus for nation-states to deploy cyber-
offensive capabilities for future conflicts.
Another milestone were the cyber attacks on the former Soviet-bloc state 
of Georgia, which mimicked the events that occurred in Estonia. The 
country's national communication infrastructure was shut down just 
before Russian military forces entered its borders in August 2008. Gov-
ernment websites and news outlets as well as banks, including Georgia's 
largest, were affected. While the country's use of the Internet is still 
emerging, the effects of the attacks limited the government's ability to 
spread its messages in time of crisis. Efforts to engage and perpetuate the 
cyber attacks during this period were consistently conducted in Russian, 
but no verifiably responsible party has been identified to date.16
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The last milestone relates to the first detection of a new breed of computer 
worm known as Stuxnet, which appeared in June 2010. It is considered 
the first worm specifically created to target real-world infrastructure, such 
as power stations and water plants. After it has hijacked a PC, Stuxnet 
looks for Siemens software that runs industrial control systems and 
begins to speed up or slow down power generation for destructive means, 
which was the case for Iran's Bushehr nuclear plant. The worm's resem-
blance to legitimate software, such as digital certificates, while using a 
self-launching, zero-day vulnerability in the attack, allowed its rapid, 
unobstructed distribution through the a priori assumption of security 
software that if a program meets certain conditions, it is trustworthy.17
The ramifications of the above milestones to national infrastructures in 
times of conflict are staggering. Not only can a nation's communication 
channels be disrupted as a force multiplier, but basic infrastructure, such 
as power and water distribution, can also be remotely attacked and dis-
abled, putting the targeted country at a distinct disadvantage. The mili-
tary establishments of many countries have for some time recognized the 
possibility of a cyber war, and we believe the above milestones were the 
impetus for both the viability and necessity of recent cyber mobilizations. 
A 1996 report prepared for the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense pro-
jected that battlefield Command, Control, Communications & Intelligence 
(C3I) vulnerabilities "may become less significant than vulnerabilities in 
the national infrastructure."18 In June 2009, the U.S. Cyber Command 
was created, and in July of 2011, Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. 
Lynn III announced that as a matter of doctrine, cyberspace will be 
treated as an operational domain similar to land, air, sea, and space.19, 20 
In their notable book, Unrestricted Warfare, Chinese colonels Liang and 
Xiangsui claimed advanced technology gave the country's adversaries a 
significant advantage, and proposed that China "build the weapons to fit 
the fight."21 Recently, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) con-
firmed the existence of its Online Blue Army.22 Many smaller countries 
have also begun developing cyber warfare divisions, but thus far have kept 
such capabilities plausibly deniable or at a low profile to avoid preemptive 
reprisals.23
All of the above are major indicators that information technologies are 
already playing an important role in carrying out military objectives. 
These examples are but a small collection of high-profile cases, and we 
believe sufficient evidence points toward countless lower-profile events 
that have gone unreported or been classified. In the next sections, we will 
discuss the theoretical foundations of national doctrine in preparation for 
addressing the larger strategic importance of technology's role in achiev-
ing military objectives.
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Doctrine
In its simplest form, a doctrine is defined as a body of principles that form 
a system of belief. A doctrine can be considered a statement of fundamen-
tal government policy; a principle of law established through past deci-
sions; or a military principle or set of strategies.24 In essence, a doctrine 
embodies the rules by which individual societies govern themselves and 
maintain standards. Therefore, a CWD in principle represents a set of 
rules and standards for governing a war involving cyberspace. When 
viewed in more depth, a doctrine brings with it a set of characteristics 
stemming from the people who embrace it and their societal processes. 
Doctrine functions to: provide a tempered analysis of experience and a 
determination of beliefs; teach those beliefs to succeeding generations; 
and offer a common basis of knowledge and understanding that can pro-
vide guidance for action.25 In other words, doctrine states how to do 
something the best possible way, and is passed on to subsequent genera-
tions. This implies that it is based on knowledge accumulated from mak-
ing strategic decisions within a domain. Therefore, doctrine may take 
many forms, either fact-dependent and limited in scope, or broadly inter-
preted and sweeping in its breadth of application.26
To form a CWD, the dominant doctrines governing a people's lives must 
be examined. The authors believe a CWD must reflect the accepted doc-
trines governing how we organize and direct ourselves, interact with oth-
ers, pursue prosperity, and defend ourselves collectively if future 
generations are to sustain and support it. In the following section we shall 
briefly examine three dominant doctrines. The first is political, which is 
most often reflected in a nation's constitution or its equivalent. The sec-
ond is legal, which often follows political doctrine as an embodiment of 
societal interaction. The last is military, which governs how a nation 
secures itself.
Political Doctrine
Throughout much of the West, it is traditionally understood that open, 
democratic societies must have a set of common understandings or gov-
erning principles that allow people to mutually interact. These principles 
are articulated through political doctrine, which establishes the political 
and social structure of a nation and the supporting structures that grow 
from its principles and shape the doctrine's impact on future generations. 
An example of political doctrine is a constitution, which may be consid-
ered a set of fundamental principles, or established precedents, according 
to which a state or other organization is governed.27
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We believe the political doctrine embodied in a nation's constitution artic-
ulates the will of a people, a new order, a new way of governance, or a new 
social doctrine. It is in this document that the prevailing political princi-
ples for governing reside, and are used to shape a society's social and legal 
environments. A national constitution is usually a mirror of a nation's 
past and a prescribed program for its future. An example of such a docu-
ment is the U.S. Constitution, adopted in 1787 at a critical moment in the 
country's history. Major conflicts with Spain and England remained unre-
solved; large amounts of capital had been drained by the war of indepen-
dence; and a substantial number of states were unsure about union 
membership. The country needed an efficient system of national govern-
ment while maintaining individual states' rights. The Constitution's pre-
amble reflects this by stating: "We the people of the United States, in 
order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic 
tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general wel-
fare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do 
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." 
The document was created at a pivotal point in history, when American 
society was compelled to choose the manner in which it would govern 
itself. We believe that to be consistent with a society's values and internal 
processes, a CWD must embrace its principles, as illuminated in a docu-
ment such as a constitution.
Legal Doctrine
Once it embraces a political doctrine, a nation must invoke systems and 
processes that exemplify its "spirit." These are often articulated in its legal 
doctrine, considered the currency of the law, in that established precedent 
becomes the foundation for determining the application of law in future 
cases. In law, rules tend to be strict requirements that identify the answer 
to a dispute once the facts have been established, while standards are 
more like guides for resolving disputes after identifying a set of factors to 
be considered and balanced.
One of the dominant doctrines in law is Stare Decisis, Latin for "Let the 
decision stand." This is a legal principle by which judges are obliged to 
respect the precedents established by prior decisions. This overarching 
principle guides courts in following standards established by decisions in 
earlier cases.28 Thus, judicial activism is minimized and consistency in 
future judicial rulings is established, allowing a people to better under-
stand their current and future legal obligations when interacting with one 
another. With Stare Decisis in mind, we strongly suggest that any new 
doctrine, including a CWD, must be based on a country's current legal 
doctrine and established precedents. There may be times, when new pre-
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cedents must be established—for example, when technological develop-
ments impact politics and the economy—but while they may help a nation 
better handle recurring problems, they may also create unforeseen conse-
quences and dysfunctions between the law and its enforceability. The 
authors therefore caution the framers of a CWD against forcing new pre-
cedents without fully considering their possible consequences.
Military Doctrine
Once a nation has decided on its basic political and legal doctrines, it 
must address how it intends to defend itself and its chosen way of life. 
Military doctrine embodies the fundamental principles by which a coun-
try's military force guides its actions in support of national objectives.29 
This doctrine can in turn be divided into fundamental, environmental, 
and organizational doctrines, which identify key military factors and 
address how each will be governed and under what conditions. The nature 
of war, as well as the purpose of military forces and their relationship to 
other instruments of power, reside in fundamental doctrine, which is rela-
tively insensitive to political philosophy or technological changes. The fol-
lowing examples are typical statements of fundamental doctrine:
•   War is the failure of policy.
•   The object of war is to overcome an enemy's hostile will.
•   The object of war is a better state of peace.
The fundamental portion of a CWD may include such statements as 
governing principles in developing environmental and organizational 
components. The cumulative understanding of military deployment in a 
particular operating medium—such as sea, air, land, and space—forms 
environmental doctrine. In the case of a CWD, the environment is likely 
to embody information technologies and computer networks, and their 
physical infrastructures. Organizational aspects likely will be adaptations 
of existing structures. Both environmental and organizational 
components will require consideration throughout the CWD development 
process.
Developing CWD Components
Considering the many details critical to formulating a CWD, serious con-
sideration of a collaborative and discussion framework is crucial. This 
section offers a conceptual starting point and present several key strategic 
questions we believe essential to forming a cyber warfare doctrine. We 
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offer these questions as critical examples of the types of queries needed to 
enable a corrective and decisive response following an attack. (These 
types of queries will form the foundation of the last section of this article.) 
Our proposed questions are:
What is the line between cyber warfare and 
traditional warfare?
Definitions matter when implementing policy, and in developing a CWD a 
variety of factors must be considered. In essence, this question focuses on 
the role of information technology as an enabler of warfare and, therefore, 
as a viable target from both attack and defense viewpoints. We believe 
cyber warfare will have kinetic world effects, meaning it will cause real 
direct and indirect damage to physical infrastructure.30 The notion that 
an information-age war would be bloodless and sterile is challenged by 
the fact that our digital infrastructures and physical capabilities are inte-
grated in order to sustain and support modern warfare.31
Information is the central element for commanding the conflict space; of 
equal importance is the infrastructure that allows information to flow. 
From a strategic perspective, we must consider an opponent in a cyber 
war as a system composed of a series of subsystems.32 Each subsystem 
that supports and sustains the larger system enables a country to direct its 
resources toward the conflict. The essential question before us is: To what 
extent will a cyber warfare conflict encompass real-world assets and lead 
to full-scale war? Without a clear distinction between cyber and tradi-
tional warfare, how can any country in the modern world take action that 
is justified, rational, and proportional to a given attack? We believe such a 
distinction is crucial.
What is the CWD conflict space?
Controlling the conflict space is central to resolving military conflicts. But 
when a country seeks to do so, what exactly are its objectives? The authors 
believe cyber warfare involves preventing opponents from knowing as lit-
tle about you while you seek to know everything about them.33 This 
"knowledge battle" extends to a nation controlling its own resources while 
rendering its opponent's ineffective.
Preventing the use of resources is central to controlling the conflict space. 
In an increasingly interdependent global economy, the implications can 
quickly escalate to encompass unforeseen consequences. Battle space 
dominance likely will include a nation's information infrastructure as well 
as the information flowing through it from both sides of the conflict. We 
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must also consider all of the pathways and infrastructure between the two 
parties in a conflict, as information infrastructures are rarely symmetric. 
These third-party pathways likely would be active or unwitting partici-
pants in attack and defense measures, as their infrastructures would sup-
port such activities. Because of the distributive architecture of cyberspace, 
defining the conflict space both in totality and in conflicts as they arise is 
the first step in developing strategies to control it.
What threshold of aggression constitutes the level of CWD 
response?
Waging a moral war is essential to sustaining it, and we believe a cyber 
war is no different. A measured response to a cyber warfare attack 
requires deterrence and escalation levels.34 The strategic objective in a 
conflict is to cause an opponent's systems to change to such an extent that 
it is forced to adopt your objectives or become incapable of mounting an 
opposition. In a retaliatory action aimed at deterring future attacks, a 
CWD should establish responses that would cost the aggressor more than 
it might stand to benefit from such attacks, thereby encouraging restraint. 
If a significant penalty beyond an incident is not established, escalating 
attacks likely will occur. But to remain moral, such responses must be 
proportional. Thus, an assessment of any attack should be accompanied 
by a suitable and corresponding response to maintain its moral justifica-
tion when damages or casualties are incurred. Therefore, determining the 
range of responses, along with their alignment with a nation's strategic 
security goals, is critical to responding responsibly to attacks.
What is the definition of a CWD victory?
War must be waged with a constant regard for the peace desired. As with 
a response and escalation policy, knowing what constitutes a CWD victory 
is essential to not overreaching. Responses to aggression must consider 
taking possession of the opponent's strengths as well as destroying its 
armed power, all while considering public opinion. Levels of desired out-
comes must be tied to any attack response. Depending on the assault's 
severity, victory may be limited to restoring operations and taking steps to 
improve defensive measures. The prevention of future attacks would then 
be a consideration in establishing victory conditions. In larger-scale con-
flicts, the partial or complete disabling of an aggressor's attack capabili-
ties may be warranted and considered a victory condition. When an 
aggressor has the full support of the country, the elimination of the attack 
infrastructure may be warranted, thus also serving as a victory condition. 
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The authors believe that a clear understanding of victory is crucial to the 
formation of a CWD, as it has profound policy implications for future 
peaceful relations with both the antagonist and the rest of the world.
What are the principal CWD assets needed to win?
A comprehensive understanding of the assets needed to wage a cyber war 
is essential to creating the infrastructure for supporting a CWD. Identify-
ing the dependencies a military force has on information technology is 
tightly coupled with defining the needed assets. Modern militaries rely 
heavily on systems that provide speed of command in order to achieve 
information superiority and the massing of effects. The result of the rapid 
foreclosure of enemy action and the shock of closely coupled events 
makes network-centric operations a significant strategic advantage.35 
Assets that enable increased information richness, reach, and shared 
awareness are responsible for the transformation of improved awareness 
into collaborative planning and synchronized action.36 Assets that pro-
vide for peacekeeping measures such as border management and verifica-
tion activities play a role in threat awareness and removal.37 We believe 
these assets, and any suitable measures to defend or attack them, must be 
identified to prevent a CWD from lacking the proper scope and depth 
when implemented.
What are the factors inhibiting an effective and decisive 
CWD response?
We live in a global community of communities, and the more integrated 
and interdependent the world becomes, the more our policies and 
responses will be moderated by those indirectly connected to our actions. 
Cyberspace is made up of core national and international infrastructures 
residing in a multitude of legal jurisdictions and global alliances. We 
believe that without fully considering the regional and global conse-
quences of taking direct action in a cyber war, no CWD would bear a sub-
stantive relation to a nation's larger strategic security policy. By 
understanding this sphere of influence and articulating the implications, 
profound long-term ramifications can be mitigated and a greater under-
standing of state actors can be cultivated. The authors believe that a CWD 
should contain remedies for factors that would inhibit effective and deci-
sive responses in any cyber war conflict. While additional issues undoubt-
edly will be raised while forming a CWD, we think the queries presented 
here are representative enough, in both depth and scope, to illustrate key 
elements that must be considered in such an endeavor.
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Collaborative and Discussion Framework
The foundation of a nation's information infrastructure is generally dis-
tributive in nature, and the creation of a CWD is no simple task if it is to 
include its closest stakeholders. Drawing upon the past for guidance, the 
authors propose a collaborative and discussion framework similar to the 
one used by President Dwight Eisenhower in confronting the expansion of 
communism and the threat of nuclear war. The president believed the 
best way to formulate national policy in a democracy was to assemble the 
best-qualified people with opposing views on an issue and listen carefully 
as they debated it.38 This approach formed the foundation of Project 
Solarium, which resulted in a doctrine that governed the Cold War, and 
whose effects are still felt today.39
We believe several fundamentals must be observed for a collaborative and 
discussion framework to be successful. The first of these is that a CWD 
initiative should be originated and governed by top government officials, 
as executive government is in the best position to facilitate and coordinate 
such an endeavor. Second, participating experts should be delegates from 
civilian government, defense, security, and professional organizations 
related to information technology, so that a broad set of skilled stakehold-
ers are represented in the problem-formulation and solving processes. 
Third, a relatively short time should be allocated to creating a CWD, forc-
ing participants to stay focused on the tasks at hand and not expand the 
mandate's range and scope. Fourth, the results of such an endeavor 
should be accepted by the nation's head of state and be widely published. 
This last step is critical, for the CWD's dissemination establishes new 
norms of conduct, and consequences for their breech. This doctrine trans-
parency is in keeping with the highest traditions of open, democratic soci-
eties and clearly changes the rules of digital importance as a national 
security imperative.
The proposed framework has three phases. In Phase One, the head of a 
nation initiates the CWD collaboration process by identifying and select-
ing the primary stakeholders—from business, government, and profes-
sional organizations—who have both a vested interest in any CWD 
outcomes and the expertise to contribute substantively to the endeavor. 
Each organization selects delegates to represent it at a convention 
charged with creating a key set of questions such as those contained in the 
previous section.
Once these questions have been agreed on, Phase Two commences, with 
the questions being sent to the selected organizations in Phase One for 
deliberation. Because knowledge is often held by unlikely participants, 
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and due to the larger implications of a CWD, the authors strongly suggest 
that these hearings be held in public forums, at which constituents may 
freely offer policy ideas in answering the key questions.
Once assembled by participating organizations, these policy suggestions 
form the basis of Phase Three, in which the business community, govern-
ment branches and agencies, and professional organizations jointly 
assemble before the nation's head of state and security council to present 
their ideas for answering the questions, and to defend their proposals 
against opposing viewpoints. Critical to this phase is that all participants 
rigorously review the areas of discourse. It falls to the security council to 
assemble policies common among stakeholders, as well as those that have 
withstood rigorous examination by all participants. A final document is 
then formulated and presented for ratification.
The authors believe the above process would create a CWD that has stake-
holder input and buy-in, that addresses a nation's main cyber war con-
cerns, and that permits decisive action with the backing of the nation-
state (see Figure 1).
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In summary, the proposed framework for developing a national CWD is 
based on several fundamental principles. The first is that such a venture 
would be conducted at the head of state's discretion, regarding both initi-
ating the CWD process as well as its final acceptance. The CWD's develop-
ment would be delegated to specialists from civilian government, defense 
personnel, security, and professional organizations related to information 
technology. The final proposals would be presented to the national-level 
security council (or other body with similar responsibilities) and ulti-
mately be accepted by the head of state. The final CWD formulation would 
then be placed in the public domain.
Conclusions
Information technology has reached a level of development and 
integration into modern societies that allows it to be used to damage a 
nation's well-being. Numerous examples are available, and this article has 
presented several of them. Attacks on information systems and 
infrastructures may soon escalate into a full-scale military conflict. 
Whether such a confrontation is provoked by third-party cyber criminals 
or state-sponsored forces, a country would do well to be prepared. Many 
other defense forces are also developing or mobilizing themselves for 
cyber conflicts on a national and international level. To our knowledge, no 
state to date has a comprehensive national strategy for handling a 
cyberwar that aligns the civilian infrastructure with military operations in 
a collaborative environment. In this article, we have summarized many of 
the dominant issues that must be addressed to formulate a 
comprehensive national CWD. We have outlined a collaborative process 
that brings together the government, business, and professional 
organizations responsible for a country's cyber infrastructure and 
national security.
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